INTRODUCTION
Along-standing estimating the effect research of taxes enterprise on economic has been growth devoted in U.S. to estimating the effect of taxes on economic growth in U.S. states. To the extent a consensus exists, it is that taxes used to fund transfer payments have small, negative effects on economic activity. When used to fund productive expenditures, the associated tax effects are often estimated to vanish, or even become positive (Helms, 1985; Bartik, 1991; Phillips and Goss, 1995; Wasylenko, 1997) . However, even this modest conclusion is disputed, since estimated effects vary widely across studies (Bartik, 1991; McGuire, 1992; Wasylenko, 1997) .
Given the scores of studies that have investigated this issue, it is surprising that many important estimation issues are often not addressed. My study takes up several of these, and re-estimates the relationship between taxes and income growth. I find that taxes used to fund general expenditures are associated with significant, negative effects on income growth. Further, I show that these effects are generally robust across estimation procedures, alternative specifications of the regression equation, different time divisions of the data, and across time periods and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions. I also provide a possible explanation for why previous research has had difficulty identifying these effects.
My analysis addresses the following estimation issues.
First, it uses economic theory to derive an estimable equation. With respect to specification of the regression equation, theory has consequences for the following: (1) the inclusion/ exclusion of labor, capital, and population variables along with, or instead of, underlying parameters such as saving, depreciation, and population growth rates; (2) the inclusion/ exclusion of a lagged dependent variable; and (3) whether to include other explanatory variables in level or differenced forms.
The Cobb-Douglas production function has now become a standard point of departure for models of economic growth. Studies that have analyzed U.S. state fiscal policy1 within this framework include Merriman (1990) , Garcia-Milá and McGuire (1992) , Evans and Karras (1994) , Holtz-Eakin (1994) , Garcia-Milá, McGuire, and Porter (1996) , Aschauer (2000), Yamarik (2000) , and Shioji (2001) . My study follows suit by employing a general version of the Cobb-Douglas production function that includes the textbook Solow model and the augmented, human capital model of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) as special cases.
A second specification issue concerns the role of time. Much of the previous literature has restricted taxes to have only contemporaneous effects on economic activity. When dynamic effects are incorporated, it is usually done indirectly, through the inclusion of a lagged income variable (e.g., Helms, 1985) . My regression specifications allow taxes to have both contemporaneous and lagged effects.2 A related issue concerns how to define the length of a time period for time series observations of states. Previous research on state-level taxes and growth has relied almost exclusively on either cross-sectional (e.g., Romans and Subrahmanyam, 1979; Mullen and Williams, 1994; Yamarik, 2000) or annual panel data (e.g., Helms, 1985; Crain and Lee, 1999) .
Cross-sectional data is undesirable because it ignores time-varying behavior in the explanatory variables. This is particularly a problem for taxes: The average state tax burden in 1999 was very close to its level in 1970 (cf. Reed, 2006, Figure   1 ), despite large variation over time.
Cross-sectional analyses also suffer from omitted variable bias due to uncontrolled fixed effects -to the extent these are not picked up in initial income levels.
On the other hand, annual data is particularly vulnerable to measurement error bias. This is, again, of particular relevance for tax studies. Using two very different approaches, Rogers (2006, 2007) estimate that roughly one-half of the annual variation in tax burden is due to factors other than tax policy. This bias is exacerbated by the inclusion of state fixed effects. Further, annual state-level income data are characterized by substantial serial correlation (cf. Evans and Karras, 1994) .
The combination of serial correlation with a lagged dependent variable produces inconsistent estimates.
Multi-year interval data also suffer from these problems, but to a lesser degree: Measurement errors are more likely to cancel out over longer time periods. Serial correlation is less severe when observations are distanced further in time. A few studies have analyzed the effects of fiscal policy using multiple-year interval data. These include Garcia-Milá A third issue is the selection of "control variables/' Growth theory is sufficiently general that many variables are potential determinants of growth. Despite this, many studies of tax effects include no, or only a few, non-fiscal variables other than initial /lagged income, time, and /or state-fixed effects (cf. Becsi, 1996; Tomljanovich, 2004; Yamarik, 2000) . Helms (1985) includes variables for state wages, percent unionization, and population density. Mullen and Williams (1994) include variables for growth of the civilian labor force, and the growth rates of private and public capital. Bania et al. (2007) employ the unemployment rate, percentage of the population that is working age, and union membership rates. Only Chernick (1997) and , notably, Crain and Lee (1999) have a broad set of control variables. My study includes an extensive set of control variables to avoid problems of bias associated with omitted variables.
That being said, it is well known that coefficient estimates are often highly dependent upon the particular set of variables included in the regression equation (Learner, 1985; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Crain and Lee, 1999; Sala-i-Martin, 2004 Tomljanovich, 2004) or serial correlation (Evans and Karras, 1994) . A few studies employ feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) to address random effects (Garcia-Milá et al., 1996; Helms, 1985; Holtz-Eakin, 1994) , though this procedure is usually rejected in favor of OLS with fixed effects. Dynamic panel data (DPD) estimators have occasionally been used to obtain consistent estimates when the regression specification includes both a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects (Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Shioji, 2001; and Bania et al., 2007 Mankiw et al. (1992) are both special cases of equation [l] . (1970-1974, 1975-1979, ... , 1995-1999) . Data for most of these variables were collected from original data sources.6
Besides previously cited benefits, fiveyear interval data7 offer two additional advantages over annual data: they (1) 8 I do not impose the restriction that ßi = (ßx + ß2 -1) because population growth could also be related to Ct, in which case the restriction would be violated.
9 For an alternative derivation that arrives at a virtually identical specification, see Bassanini, Scarpetta, and Hemmines (2001) .
10 Previous studies of fiscal policy that specify income growth as the dependent variable have typically included either (1) level (cf. Helms, 1985; Chernick, 1997; Yamarick, 2000) or (2) differenced forms of the explanatory variables (cf. Evans and Karras, 1994; Garcia-Milá et al., 1996; Crain and Lee, 1999) , but not both. Romans and Subrahmanyam (1979) and Mullen and Williams (1994) are the exceptions.
As my measure of taxes, I use tax burden, defined as the ratio of state and local tax revenues to personal income.
Tax burden is by far the most commonly employed measure of state taxation, and can be thought of as the " effective average tax rate" in a state (e.g., Helms, 1985; Mofidi and Stone, 1990; Mullen and Williams, 1994; Carroll and Wasylenko, 1994; Knight, 2000; Caplan, 2001; Yamarik, 2000 Yamarik, , 2004 Aim and Rogers, 2005) . (p-value = 0.000) (p-value = 0.000) (p-value = 0.000) (p-value = 0.000) (p-valu Note: Coefficients are estimated using OLS. ř-statistics are reported in parentheses and are calculated us eroscedasticity-robust standard errors. All equations include state and time fixed effects. AICc denotes version of the AIC. Summary statistics for each of the variables are reported in the Appendix.
INITIAL EMPIRICAL RESULTS
11 A mathematically equivalent specification is to include the level of tax burden at the begi the period (times t -4 and t, respectively Partridge and Rickman (1996) ; Clark and Murphy (1996) ; Ciccone and Hall (1996) ; Crain and Lee (1999) Working population Percent of population between Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) ; Mofidi and 20 and 64 years of age (source: Stone (1990); Dalenberg and Partridge (1995) ; Census) Crain and Lee (1999) Nonwhite Percent of population that is Mofidi and nonwhite (source: Census) Rickman (1996); Crain and Lee (1999) Female Percent of population that is Mofidi and Stone (1990) ; Partridge and female (source: Census) Rickman (1996); Clark and Murphy (1996) Population Log of total population Ciccone and Hall (1996) ; Aim and Rogers (2005) (source: Census)
Population density Population density Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) ; Carroll and (source: Census) Wasyenko (1994); Clark and Murphy (1996) ; Ciccone and Hall (1996) ; Crain and Lee (1999) Urban Percent of population living in Holtz-Eakin (1993); Partridge and Rickman urban areas (source: Census) (1996); Crain and Lee (1999) Agriculture Share of total earnings earned in Crown and Wheat (1995) ; Caselli and Coleman "Farm" and "Other Agriculture" (2001) industries (source: BEA)
Manufacturing Share of total earnings earned Crown and Wheat (1995) ; Crain and Lee (1999) ; in "Manufacturing" industries Caselli and Coleman (2001); Stansel (2005) (source: BEA)
Service Share of total earnings earned Clark and Murphy (1996) in "Service" industries (source: BEA)
Mining Share of total earnings earned Holtz-Eakin (1993); Crown and Wheat (1995) ; in "Mining" industries (source: Clark and Murphy (1996) ; Mitchener and BEA) McLean (2003) Union Percent of nonagricultural wage Plaut and Pluta (1983) ; Mofidi and Stone (1990) ; and salary employees who are Dalenberg and Partridge (1995) Criterion (AICc).17 This produces three sets of regression results, each of which is reported in Table 3 .
Of greatest interest are the first two rows of Table 3 . These report the esti- Table 1 , where the estimated values are -1.37 and -0.90, respectively. Nevertheless, they remain negative across all the expanded specifications of Table 3 . Further, they continue to be highly significant. In the "All Variables" specification, TaxBurden(D) and TaxBurden(L) have ¿-statistics (p-values) of, respectively, -2.58 (0.011) and -2.8 7(0.004).
The corresponding ř-statistics are even higher in the "Best SIC" and "Best AICc" specifications. And while these latter two specifications are the product of sequential search, the ¿-statistics /p-values for the two tax variables can still be interpreted in the classical manner because the search procedure includes these two variables in every specification.
Turning to the other variables, I find that the estimated coefficients are generally consistent with the predictions of growth theory, or at least not inconsistent. Focusing on the coefficients from column 2 of Table 3 -the "Best SIC Specification" -we observe the following results (ignoring the distinction between initial levels and contemporaneous changes):
higher educational attainment, a greater percentage of the population who are of working age, a greater percentage of the population that is nonwhite, a larger population, a greater reliance on agriculture, and a more unionized workforce are associated with higher income growth. A larger female population, a larger mining sector, and greater industrial diversity are associated with lower income growth.
Lastly, ceteris paribus , states with a greater initial value of real PCPI grow slower than other states.
In conclusion, I find that the significant, negative tax effects first reported in column 1 of Table 1 
Robustness with Respect to Alternative Estimation Procedures
The subsequent analysis employs the variable specification of column 2 of (Beck and Katz, 1995) , or by using a more robust estimator of the error variance-covariance matrix.
Another is to follow-up a suggestion by Greene (2003, cf 333f) There is an additional concern. The explanatory variables include both fixed effects and a lagged form of the dependent variable as explanatory variables. This generates correlation between the error term and the lagged form of the dependent variable, causing biased coefficient estimates (Nickell, 1981) . To address this concern, I use two DPD estimators: the Arellano-Bond (difference) one-step and two-step procedures.23 21 I use Pesaran's test for cross-sectional dependence available in the STATA command xtcsd, which is distributed asymptotically standard normal. The corresponding cross-sectional dependence (CD) statistic is -1.481 with a p-value of 0.1385. However, this test assumes that the cross-sectional correlations are all same-signed. It has low power when the cross-sectional correlations are not same-signed, which describes my data. The average, absolute value of the cross-sectional correlations is 0.375 even with the inclusion of time fixed effects. This is quite large. Accordingly, I correct some of my estimates for cross-sectional correlation even though I do not formally reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence.
22 Note that "White standard errors" are robust only to heteroscedasticity, and not cross-sectional correlation.
23 The DPD estimates were obtained using STATA's xtabond2 procedure. Note that both the one-step and two-step procedures assume no cross-sectional correlation. I do not use the DPD (system) estimator because the key moment condition in the level equation requires that the "distance" between a state's initial income and its "steady-state" value be uncorrected with the state fixed effect (cf. Roodman, 2006, page 27) . This is clearly violated in endogenous growth models and likely violated in exogenous growth models. 1970-1974, 1975-1979, ..., 1995-1999. This section looks at two alternative ways of dividing the data.
The first approach allows the endpoint of one five-year period to coincide with the beginning of the next five-year period.
Following this approach, the data are divided as follows : 1970-1975, 1975-1980, 1980-1985, ..., 1995-2000 . A drawback of this approach is that it forces dependency between contiguous time periods. An alternative approach keeps the endpoints and beginning points of the periods separate, but shifts the data by a year: 1971-1975, 1976-1980, ..., 1996-2000. This analysis takes its starting point as the variable specification of column 2, Table 3 , estimated with FGLS (weighting on groupwise heteroscedasticity) using robust Variance-Covariance Estimation (VCE) to address heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation.24 These results were previously reported in abbreviated form in Table 4 and are repeated in column 1 of Table 5 . The subsequent two columns use the same variable specification and estimation procedure, but employ different cuts of the data.
Alternative cuts of the data can make a difference. For example, the estimates for Female(D) change considerably, with the 24 I chose this estimation procedure given that testing of the residuals produced evidence of groupwise heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation. 1970-1974, 1970-1975, 1971-1975, 1975-1979, 1975-1980, 1976-1980 Note: Each of the three sets of regression result with robust VCE for heteroscedasticity and cros below the respective coefficient estimates. The f (cf. third row from bottom in Table 4 ). The next t data.
respective ¿-values ranging from -4.38 to -1.51. The coefficients for Mining (D) and Diversity(L) also show substantial variation, even switching signs. Indeed, the coefficient for TaxBurden(L) in column 3 is less than one-half the size of the equivalent estimate in column 1, with a correspondingly large change in the respective i-statistic. Nevertheless, these estimates provide overall confirmation of the previous tax burden results. Across the alternative time divisions of the data, the coefficients of the two tax variables are uniformly, negatively signed and statistically significant, always having a ř-statistic larger than two in absolute value.
Robustness across Time Periods , Regions , and States A possible concern with previous estimates is that the results may be driven by a few time periods, regions, or states with particularly strong relationships between tax burden and income growth, and that these may not be broadly representative for the majority of observations. Previous specifications assumed that the estimated tax effects were the same for all observations. In this section, I use interaction terms to estimate individual time period, region, and state effects.
I first check for robustness across time periods. There are a total of six five-year periods: 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999 . The variable specification for this analysis continues to use the "Best SIC Specification" from Table 3 , but supplements it with time-interaction effects to capture changes in the tax burden/income growth relationship over time. Following the previous results on estimation procedures, all coefficients are estimated using FGLS (with weighting for groupwise heteroscedasticity), with a White robust estimator for heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation used to calculate standard errors. I first estimate time-specific coefficients for the variable TaxBurden(D). I then repeat the robustness check by estimating time-specification coefficients for the variable TaxBurden(L). Table 6 summarizes the results. Notably, each of the 12 time-specific coefficients is negative. Ten of the 12 are individually significant. While the pattern is not perfect, smaller estimated coefficients for TaxBurden(D) are generally accompanied by larger coefficients for TaxBurdend), and vice versa.25 A similar pattern is observed when I estimate region-and state-specific interaction terms. An interpretation consistent with these results is that changes in tax burden take longer to register their 1970-1974 -1.1551 -9.83 -0.3062 -5.18 1975-1979 -0.7518 -4.58 -0.6710 -7.32 1980-1984 -0.0615 -0.24 -0.6455 -7.18 1985-1989 -0.1642 -0.71 -0.9044 -6.61 1990-1994 -0.6450 -2.97 -1.0086 -8.20 1995-1999 Note: Regress Table  3,  suppl  estimation  pr  ity  and  cross   25  The  smalle and Wasylen effects for some time periods, regions, and states. That being said, the main finding from Table 6 is that the estimated relationships between income growth, and both the differenced and level forms of tax burden, are negative for every time period. The results of Table 7 are not as robust as those of Note: Regression results are derived from a regress of Table 3 , supplemented with the respective interact estimation procedure is FGLS (weighting on groupwise and cross-sectional correlation. The first column repro last row of This suggests that previous studies may have failed to identify a negative relationship between taxes and income growth because they relied on specifications that used annual data and did not allow for lagged tax effects. My analysis suggests that tax policies take time to work its full effects on the economy. When the specification is sufficiently general to pick up these effects, a negative relationship between taxes and income growth emerges.
The use of annual data may also have contributed to previous findings 27 We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients associated with the difference and level forms of the two kinds of revenues are the same. The associated p-values for the specifications of columns 2 and 3 are 0.51 and 0.47.
28 State Personal Income as measured by the BEA includes transfer payments. period. 8" NonTaxRevenues" is defined as General Revenues (state + local) minus Total Taxes (state + local) divided by Personal Income at the start of the fiscal year (source: Census). 9" Welfare" is defined as Direct General Expenditure of State and Local Governments on Public Welfare divided by Personal Income at the start of the fiscal year (source: Census).
